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Twenty-five years ago, students in the environmental law program 
at the University of Oregon founded the Journal of Environmental 
Law and Litigation (JELL). Starting a new law journal is never an 
easy enterprise, but these students would not be denied. With no 
initial financial support from the law school, students built JELL into 
a widely respected source for both scholarly and practical articles on 
an exceptionally wide variety of topics. Many of these students now 
have distinguished careers in the field of environmental law. In the 
twenty-five years since its initial issue, JELL has proved to be not 
only an outstanding resource on issues involving law and the 
environment, but also a catalyst for conferences, debates, and 
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interdisciplinary work on the most pressing environmental issues of 
the last twenty-five years. 
At the time of JELL’s inception in 1986, one of the courses I 
taught at the law school was an environmental law clinic. In this 
clinic, students worked on behalf of nonprofit citizen groups in cases 
involving federal environmental laws. Many of the battles in these 
cases involved whether our clients should even be allowed to present 
the substance of their cases in court. Procedural defenses such as 
standing, ripeness, exhaustion, and deference to administrative 
agencies were (and still are) common in these public law cases. 
During this time, we faced an increasing body of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that expanded these defenses and diminished citizen 
access to courts to enforce environmental laws. 
In 2003, I left the law school and began representing public 
agencies (primarily municipalities and water districts) in tort litigation 
against polluters of public drinking water supplies (primarily 
groundwater). In this practice, I have had to become familiar with 
case law addressing common law tort remedies for interference with 
property interests—especially property interests in groundwater. The 
contrast between jurisprudence involving access to courts to present 
tort claims involving property interests and jurisprudence involving 
access to courts to present claims involving public rights and public 
laws is stark. 
In cases involving tort claims for environmental damage to private 
property, courts, including the Supreme Court, have been generous in 
keeping the door to the courthouse open so that the substance of such 
claims can be determined. In such cases, defendants use the 
“preemption” defense in much the same way that defendants in public 
law cases use standing, exhaustion, and ripeness—that is, to argue 
that courts may not even reach the substance of a plaintiff’s claim. It 
is illuminating to compare jurisprudence, including Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, on preemption in tort cases with jurisprudence, 
including Supreme Court jurisprudence, on standing in citizen suits. 
Such a comparison reveals that courts are more willing to allow 
citizens access to courts to redress environmental harm to private 
property than they are to allow citizen access to the courts to redress 
environmental harm to public resources. 
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I 
PREEMPTION JURISPRUDENCE IN TORT CASES INVOLVING 
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE. 
The United States Supreme Court, while restricting the ability of 
citizens to enforce public laws, has broadly interpreted “savings” 
provisions in environmental (and other) legislation to allow state tort 
claims to proceed despite potential interference with federal 
regulatory programs. A plausible explanation for this contrast is that a 
fundamentally conservative Court is predisposed to protect private 
property interests and historical causes of action but reluctant to 
protect public rights through the relatively new means of citizen suits 
(as opposed to the traditional enforcement of public rights by the 
executive branch alone). 
In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,1 for example, the Court 
rejected an argument that imposing common law liability on pesticide 
manufacturers would conflict with the comprehensive regulatory 
authority given to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act2 (FIFRA). The 
Court rejected these arguments even in the absence of a “savings” 
provision in FIFRA specifically preserving state common law causes 
of action. The Court held: “The long history of tort litigation against 
manufacturers of poisonous substances adds force to the basic 
presumption against pre-emption. If Congress had intended to deprive 
injured parties of a long available form of compensation, it surely 
would have expressed that intent more clearly.”3 
The Bates Court specifically held that jury verdicts in tort cases 
were not to be treated as the equivalent of state regulatory 
“requirements” for purposes of preemption analysis. The Court held: 
“The Court of Appeals was . . . quite wrong when it assumed that an[] 
event, such as a jury verdict, that might ‘induce’ a . . . manufacturer to 
change its [conduct] should be viewed as a requirement.”4 The Bates 
Court was not concerned that allowing juries to decide tort claims 
involving subject matter regulated by federal agencies might result in 
inconsistent standards. The Court specifically found that “properly 
instructed juries might on occasion reach contrary conclusions on a 
 
1 544 U.S. 431 (2005). 
2 7 U.S.C.S. §§ 136–136y (LexisNexis 2012). 
3 544 U.S. at 449. 
4 Id. at 443. 
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similar issue,”5 but this fact did not compel a finding that state tort 
claims were preempted by federal legislation. 
Even when the Court has found that federal legislation preempts or 
precludes federal common law, it has carefully distinguished 
traditional state common law remedies. In American Electric Power 
Co., Inc. v. Connecticut,6 the Court found that the Clean Air Act 
preempted any federal common law of nuisance that might otherwise 
apply to carbon dioxide generating activities that contributed to global 
warming. The Court held that it need not address whether there was a 
federal common law right of the nature claimed by plaintiffs, because 
“[a]ny such claim would be displaced by the federal legislation 
authorizing EPA to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions.”7 
The American Electric Court made two important observations 
about state tort law in the course of finding federal common law 
preemption. First, it emphasized that to the extent there is a body of 
federal common law, such law relies heavily on state common law for 
its guiding principles.8 Second, the Court made clear that it was not 
ruling on whether state common law nuisance remedies were 
preempted by the Clean Air Act.9 
The Court’s willingness to preserve state common law remedies in 
the face of federal preemption arguments has not been limited to the 
field of environmental law. In Williamson v. Mazda Motors of 
America, Inc.,10 the Court found the fact that tort damages would 
make one agency proposed alternative more expensive than another 
agency proposed alternative did not create “conflict preemption.”11 
The Williamson Court went on to explain: 
[T]o infer from the mere existence of such a cost-effectiveness 
judgment that the federal agency intends to bar States from 
imposing stricter standards would treat all such federal standards as 
if they were maximum standards, eliminating the possibility that the 
 
5 Id. at 452. 
6 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
7 Id. at 2537. 
8 Id. at 2536. 
9 Id. at 2540 (“None of the parties have briefed preemption or otherwise addressed the 
availability of a claim under state nuisance law. We therefore leave the matter open for 
consideration on remand.”). 
10 131 S. Ct. 1131. 
11 Id. at 1139 (“[T]he fact that DOT made a negative judgment about cost 
effectiveness—cannot by itself show that DOT sought to forbid common-law tort suits in 
which a judge or jury might reach a different conclusion.”). 
AXLINE 7/10/2012  9:17 AM 
2012] Differential Access to Justice in Environmental Cases 25 
Involving Private Property and Public Laws 
federal agency seeks only to set forth a minimum standard 
potentially supplemented through state tort law. We cannot 
reconcile this consequence with a statutory saving clause that 
foresees the likelihood of a continued meaningful role for state tort 
law.12 
The Williamson Court emphasized that the key inquiry was 
whether giving manufacturers a choice was a specific goal of 
Congress, or whether giving manufacturers a choice was a means to 
an end for Congress. Unless providing manufacturers with a choice 
was a specific goal of Congress, the Court was unwilling to find 
intent to preempt state tort law. 
The Supreme Court’s expansive approach to remedies for injury to 
private property has not been limited to rejecting preemption 
arguments. The Court has also generously interpreted federal 
legislation authorizing recovery of the expenses involved in removing 
hazardous substances from private property. In Cooper Industries, 
Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.,13 for example, the Court emphasized that 
the “sole function” of the savings clause of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) “is to clarify that § 113(f)(1) [§ 9613(f)(1)] does nothing 
to ‘diminish’ any cause(s) of action for contribution that may exist 
independently of § 113(f)(1).”14 
In United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.,15 the Court addressed 
the relationship between the private response cost provisions of          
§ 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA and the “contribution” provisions of         
§ 113(f) of CERCLA. The Court rejected the argument that § 113(f) 
bars parties who are themselves “responsible” for contamination from 
invoking § 107(a)(4)(B) to recover from other responsible parties.16 
 
12 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
13 543 U.S. 157 (2004). 
14 Id. at 579. 
15 551 U.S. 128 (2007). 
16 See id. at 138–39. Prior to the Atl. Research decision, some courts were unwilling to 
allow parallel common law contribution claims in CERCLA actions involving one 
potentially responsible party (PRP) suing another PRP. Even then, however, as the court 
stated in Allied Corp. v. Frola (D.N.J., Sept. 21, 1993, No. Civ. A. 87-462): 
Although the court will bar [plaintiffs’] indemnification claims, it would strain the 
meaning of “contribution bar” beyond common sense and congressional intent to 
find that section 113(f)(2) precludes state tort claims. This claim is not a thinly 
veiled “change in nomenclature” to sneak by section 113(f)(2), but an independent  
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The Court found that § 107(a)(4)(B)’s authorization of causes of 
action to recover remediation costs “sweep[s] in virtually all persons 
likely to incur cleanup costs.”17 
The Court also rejected the argument that allowing responsible 
parties to recover response costs would interfere with the incentives 
for settlement contained in the contribution provisions of § 113(f).18 
The Court found: 
[P]ermitting PRPs to seek recovery under § 107(a) will not 
eviscerate the settlement bar set forth in § 113(f)(2). That provision 
prohibits § 113(f) contribution claims against “[a] person who has 
resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an 
administrative or judicially approved settlement . . . .” 42 U.S.C.     
§ 9613(f)(2). The settlement bar does not by its terms protect 
against cost-recovery liability under § 107(a). For several reasons, 
we doubt this supposed loophole would discourage settlement. First, 
as stated above, a defendant PRP may trigger equitable 
apportionment by filing a § 113(f) counterclaim. A district court 
applying traditional rules of equity would undoubtedly consider any 
prior settlement as part of the liability calculus.19 
University of Oregon School of Law and JELL alumnus Jay Geck 
argued on behalf of amicus curiae the State of Washington for the 
winning side in Atlantic Research. 
State and lower federal courts have also broadly interpreted 
statutory remedies for environmental injuries to private property and 
have been reluctant to find preemption of state tort law remedies in 
environmental cases. 
For example, in PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,20 the Seventh 
Circuit held: 
The purpose of CERCLA’s savings clause is to preserve to victims 
of toxic wastes the other remedies they may have under federal or 
state law . . . . The legislature doesn’t want to wipe out people’s 
rights inadvertently, with the possible consequence of making the 
 
claim with its own elements. That judicial construction of CERCLA has found 
CERCLA to preserve consistent state remedies reinforces today’s decision. 
1993 WL 388970 at 11 (1993). 
17 Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. at 129. 
18 Id. In rejecting the Third Circuit’s reasoning in In re Reading Co., the Atl. Research 
opinion cited the Third Circuit’s most recent case applying this reasoning, E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co. v. U.S., 460 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2006). Id. 
19 Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. at 140–41. 
20 151 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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intended beneficiaries . . . worse off . . . . [CERCLA] was not 
intended to wipe out the common law of nuisance.21 
In Board of Education of the Gorham Fayette Local v. D.H. 
Holdings Corp.,22 after extensively reviewing the legislative history 
of CERCLA’s “savings” clause, the court found that § 9613 of 
CERCLA does not preempt state common law damage claims for 
contamination of property, even adjacent to CERCLA cleanup sites.23 
In Samples v. Conoco, Inc., the court rejected a claim that 
plaintiffs’ common law claims “in effect” challenged the adequacy of 
the cleanup at the site.24 The Samples court considered the “savings 
clauses” in CERCLA and the extensive legislative history addressing 
common law damage claims and CERCLA’s cost recovery 
mechanisms. The Samples court found: 
Plaintiffs’ lawsuit does not constitute a “challenge” to the consent 
decree . . . . The lawsuit is not an action designed to review or 
contest the remedy selected by the EPA, prior to implementation; it 
is not an action designed to obtain a court order directing the EPA 
to select a different remedy; it is not an action designed to delay, 
enjoin, or prevent the implementation of a remedy selected by EPA; 
and it is not a citizen suit . . . .25 
 
21 Id. at 617–18. See also CERCLA § 9607(i) (exempting some pesticide applications 
from CERCLA, but providing: “Nothing in this paragraph shall affect or modify in any 
way the obligations or liability of any person under . . . common law, for damages, injury, 
or loss resulting from a release or a threatened release of any hazardous substance or for 
removal or remedial action”). 42 U.S.C.A. § 9614(c)(1)(B) (West 2012). 
22 No. 3:04 CV 7390 at 1–2 (N.D. Ohio 2005). 
23 See Samples v. Conoco, Inc., 165 F. Supp.2d 1303, 1312 (N.D. Fla. 2001) (common 
law damage claims for cost of removing PCE from property adjacent to regulated site is 
not preempted by CERCLA); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Products Liab. 
Litig., 488 F.3d 112, 134–35 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting preemption challenge to 
groundwater contamination claims); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Products 
Liab. Litig., 341 F. Supp.2d 386, 403–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Courtaulds Aerospace, Inc. v. 
Huffman 1994 WL 508163, at 4 (E.D. Cal., June 9, 1994, No. CV-F-91-518 OWW) 
(adjacent landowner whose property was contaminated allowed to challenge inadequate 
and underfunded government remediation). 
24 See Samples, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1303 (the cleanup was the subject of a consent decree 
by the same court that rejected the preemption challenge). 
25 Id. at 1315–16. These descriptions of the pre-enforcement challenges barred by         
§ 9613(h) are similar to cases such as McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 
F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1995), Hanford Downwinders Coal., Inc. v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469 (9th 
Cir. 1995), and Fort Ord Toxics Project, Inc. v. Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 189 F.3d 828 
(9th Cir. 1999), in which agencies conducting cleanups were named defendants. Claims 
that common law actions indirectly challenge cleanups, in contrast, have generally met 
with judicial skepticism. 
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The Samples court’s review of the legislative history of 42 U.S.C.      
§ 9613(h) (the provision of CERCLA addressing “preenforcement” 
direct challenges to EPA actions), cites sponsor after sponsor, on both 
sides of the aisle, assuring members of Congress that CERCLA would 
not be used as a shield to bar state common law claims brought by 
adjacent landowners. Typical of these comments are those of Senator 
Stafford, a member of the Conference Committee, who stated: 
The time of review of judicial challenges to cleanups is governed by 
113(h) for those suits to which it is applicable. It is not by any 
means applicable to all suits. For purposes of those based on State 
law, for example, 113(h) governs only those brought under State 
law which is applicable or relevant and appropriate as defined under 
Section 121 [i.e., challenges based on state cleanup standards.] In 
no case is State nuisance law, whether public or private nuisance, 
affected by 113(h).26 
In City of Modesto Redevelopment Agency v. Superior Court, the 
court held that manufacturers and distributors of perchloroethylene 
(PCE) could be held liable for the contamination caused by PCE 
released at dry cleaning operations if, under the totality of the 
evidence, it was shown that defendants created, or assisted in the 
creation, of a nuisance.27 Upon remand, the trial court issued a 
lengthy Final Statement of Decision: 
The manufacturer defendants in this case did more than simply 
place their PCE products into the stream of commerce without 
adequate warnings. Because their PCE products were fungible, the 
manufacturers competed in the marketplace by touting their 
expertise, professionalism, and individualized services. Their 
customers were relatively high volume businesses and used 
substantial amounts of PCE on a daily basis, and the manufacturers 
encouraged these businesses to rely on the manufacturers’ advice, 
 
26 Samples, 165 F.Supp. 2d at 1312 (quoting 132 CONG. REC. 28,406, 28,410 (1986) 
(emphasis omitted)). See also Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928, 941–
52 (9th Cir. 2002) (“CERCLA contains three separate savings clauses [including                
§ 9652(d)’s “common law” savings language] . . . . [W]e see no reason why California 
cities may not enact municipal environmental response ordinances keying cleanup to 
standards other than the NCP. . . . [A] city may borrow or adapt the NCP as it sees fit . . . 
An agreement with or authorization from the state is not a prerequisite to local 
environmental legislation.”); City of Lodi v. Randtron, 118 Cal. App. 4th 337, 352–53 
(2004) (citing the savings provision of the Water Code, § 13002, and concluding that 
municipalities have authority to “provid[e] for the summary abatement of a public 
nuisance [citations] and for relief from contamination and pollution . . .”); Manor Care, 
Inc. v. Yaskin, 950 F.2d 122, 127 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Congress did not intend for CERCLA 
remedies to preempt complementary state remedies.”). 
27 119 Cal. App. 4th 28, 40–41 (2004). 
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instruction and expertise. The manufacturers published newsletters 
to their customers, provided technical literature to their customers, 
and trained sales personnel to promote reliance by the customers on 
the manufacturer’s expertise. . . . 
 With knowledge of the customers’ improper waste handling and 
disposal practices, the manufacturers nevertheless failed for too 
long to include in their written and oral communications to their 
customers the message that those PCE waste handling and disposal 
practices, whose origins were found in the recommendations of the 
manufacturers themselves, should be stopped. By the time the 
message was effectively delivered, the contamination here at issue 
had already occurred. The manufacturers did too little too late to 
undo the harm that they had earlier caused. In short, the essential 
transgressions were affirmative acts, viz the delivery of improper 
messages not timely withdrawn.28 
These rulings would never have been issued, of course, if the trial 
court concluded that state nuisance law was preempted by federal 
hazardous waste laws such as CERCLA. 
In In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Products Liability 
Litigation,29 the court rejected an argument by defendants that the 
Orange County Water District’s (OCWD) common law damage 
claims for groundwater contamination should be stayed because they 
might interfere with the remedial efforts of other agencies: 
OCWD responds that other agencies have not and generally do not 
provide the types of remediation it seeks to fund. While other 
agencies such as the Regional Board or OCHCA may engage in 
spill-site remediation, they do not attempt remediation or 
containment of MTBE plumes that may have escaped the spill site 
before remediation efforts began (or may persist despite such 
efforts), which is in part what OCWD seeks here. OCWD asks this 
Court for monetary relief necessary to proactively identify and 
remediate or contain MTBE plumes that have already escaped a 
spill site and may eventually make their way into the groundwater 
basins served by OCWD. Defendants characterize OCWD’s plans 
to address plumes rather than spill sites as “second-guessing” the 
decisions of other agencies. The record suggests, however, that 
OCWD’s proposal would complement, not negate, the other 
agencies’ efforts, and that the other agencies might welcome the 
additional assistance. Further, the agencies’ regulatory decisions 
and remediation plans are guided at least in part by the availability 
of resources, such that lack of remedial action by an agency cannot 
be taken as a decision that no further remediation is necessary. Thus 
 
28 Slip Op. at 17–18. 
29 No. 1:00-1898, 2007 WL 700819 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2007). 
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it is inappropriate to classify OCWD’s supplemental efforts as 
“second-guessing.”30 
The court rejected defendants’ argument that allowing OCWD’s 
suit to proceed “guarantees inconsistent results that will jeopardize 
the ability of the regulatory system effectively to investigate and 
remediate groundwater contamination.”31 
Because multiple agencies are responsible for remediation efforts 
within a geographic area, and because a defendant’s conduct in 
handling MTBE often has effects that cross water district 
boundaries, it is perfectly reasonable that even a single MTBE 
release could subject a defendant to the concurrent oversight of 
several agencies. If defendants’ concern is that they might be 
“double-charged” for redundant remediation efforts, that is an issue 
of damages, not primary jurisdiction, and defendants will have the 
opportunity to be heard on that issue at the appropriate time.32 
Although CERCLA’s private response cost remedies are limited to 
incurred costs and declaratory relief, the Ninth Circuit determined, in 
Stanton Road Associates v. Lohrey Enterprise, that this limitation 
does not apply to state common law claims for future response costs 
because CERCLA’s savings clause expressly preserved such common 
law claims.33 The concern behind CERCLA’s remedies limitation—
“allowing recovery for future costs absent any binding commitment to 
incur these costs would leave no incentive to complete the 
cleanup”34—can be alleviated for common law claims by equitable 
trusts or similar accounts. In Stanton Road Associates, the Ninth 
Circuit approved just such a procedure and upheld placing “future 
response costs” of $1,100,000 into a trust account to be used for 
remediating PCE on property adjacent to a dry cleaning site.35 
Of course, agency decisions about how to employ limited resources 
when it comes to addressing hazardous waste must include the 
discretion to allow private parties to proceed with tort actions without 
agencies joining in such actions. 
 
30 Id. at *6 (citations and emphasis omitted). 
31 Id. (citation omitted). 
32 Id. at n.58. 
33 984 F.2d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 1993). 
34 In re Dant & Russell, Inc. 951 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir. 1991). 
35 Stanton, 984 F.2d at 1017, 1021–22; see also New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. 
Supp. 2d 1185, 1263 (D. N.M. 2004) (proposing an equitable or constructive “cleanup 
trust” supervised by the court). 
AXLINE 7/10/2012  9:17 AM 
2012] Differential Access to Justice in Environmental Cases 31 
Involving Private Property and Public Laws 
In Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corp., FAG moved to join the 
Missouri Department of Natural Resources (MDNR) as a necessary 
party in an action against FAG for remediation costs.36 FAG based its 
motion, in part, on MDNR’s previous statement that it intended to sue 
FAG for the costs of remediation. FAG contended that joinder was 
necessary to prevent FAG “from incurring double, multiple, or 
otherwise inconsistent obligations.”37 Over MDNR’s objection to 
joinder, the district court granted FAG’s motion and joined MDNR as 
a defendant.38 
MDNR argued on appeal that involuntary joinder interfered with 
MDNR’s sovereign power to decide when to prosecute and when not 
to prosecute—decisions at the heart of the agency’s executive powers. 
The Court of Appeals agreed, finding that a suit is “against the state” 
if “‘the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or 
domain, or interfere with the public administration,’ or if the effect of 
the judgment would be ‘to restrain the Government from acting, or to 
compel it to act.’”39 Applying this definition, the Eighth Circuit held 
that the Eleventh Amendment barred the involuntary joinder of 
MDNR: 
Involuntary joinder will compel MDNR to act by forcing it to 
prosecute FAG at a time and place dictated by the federal courts. 
This disrespect for state autonomy in decision-making is precisely 
what the Eleventh Amendment was intended to avoid. Indeed, 
“‘[t]he very object and purpose of the Eleventh Amendment [is] to 
prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of 
judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties.’” 
Permitting coercive joinder also undermines the two aims of the 
Eleventh Amendment: protection for a state’s autonomy and 
protection for its pocketbook. Involuntary joinder diminishes state 
sovereignty by permitting FAG to unilaterally waive MDNR’s 
Eleventh Amendment immunity. As a general matter, only 
unmistakable and explicit waiver by the state itself qualifies as a 
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.40 
The assumption that state agencies will (or must) address all 
contamination at all sites runs counter to the reality that agencies have 
 
36 50 F.3d 502, 503–04 (8th Cir.1995). 
37 Id. at 504. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 505 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101, 
n.11 (1984) (internal citations omitted)). 
40 Id. at 505–06 (citations omitted). 
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limited resources and their discretion in deciding how and where to 
expend those resources must be acknowledged and protected. 
Although CERCLA and the HSAA grant responsible agencies the 
authority to clean up the furthest reaches of every plume of 
contamination, those agencies have neither the resources nor a 
statutory directive to do so. Rather than imposing nondiscretionary 
mandates, both CERCLA and the HSAA grant agencies discretionary 
authority to address contamination within the limits of agency 
resources. 
As with citizen suits, private tort actions can and do complement 
the efforts of regulatory agencies when it comes to contamination of 
public water supplies. In City of Modesto, the defendants argued that 
allowing private tort remedies would interfere with the discretion of 
regulatory agencies to make cleanup decisions. In response, plaintiffs 
obtained a declaration from the Counsel for the Regional Water 
Quality Control Boards in California stating, in part: 
 4. The Regional Water Boards do not have sufficient resources 
to issue Cleanup and Abatement Orders pursuant to California 
Water Code section 13304 or seek judicial injunctions pursuant to 
California Water Code sections 13002(c) or 13340 to compel all 
dischargers to undertake investigative and remedial actions at all 
polluted sites for which they are responsible. 
 5. The Regional Water Boards do not have sufficient resources 
to thoroughly oversee all aspects of investigative and remedial 
activities at all polluted sites. 
 6. While the Regional Water Boards use some of their resources 
to issue Cleanup and Abatement Orders or seek injunctions to 
compel investigative and remedial actions at some polluted sites, 
the Regional Water Boards also use a substantial portion of their 
resources to engage in limited oversight of voluntary investigation 
and remediation efforts at many other polluted sites throughout the 
state. 
 7. Therefore, the Regional Water Boards have a substantial 
interest in the continued ability of non-dischargers (including public 
and private entities) and dischargers to both compel dischargers to 
undertake investigative and remedial actions at polluted sites and to 
voluntarily undertake investigative and remedial actions 
themselves.41 
Lower courts have also been generous in interpreting legislation 
designed to preserve private remedies in hazardous waste 
 
41 Declaration of Philip G. Wyels, Assistant Chief Counsel in the California State 
Water Resources Control Board’s Office of Chief Counsel. 
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contaminations from arguments that the remedies are barred by 
statutes of limitations. The Ninth Circuit held in O’Connor v. Boeing 
North America, that section 9658 of CERCLA preempts California 
law with respect to the commencement of the statute of limitations 
period in cases involving hazardous substances.42 Under section 9658, 
the statute commences only when a plaintiff has “knowledge of the 
critical facts of his injury, which are that he has been hurt and who 
has inflicted the injury.”43 The Ninth Circuit stated: 
[W]e reject an interpretation of the federal discovery rule that would 
commence limitations periods upon mere suspicion of the elements 
of a claim. Under the circumstances presented here, such a standard 
would result in “the filing of preventative and often unnecessary 
claims, lodged simply to forestall the running of the statute of 
limitations.”44 
The court sensibly stated, “We seek to forestall such a ‘legal 
cascade.’”45 
The Ninth Circuit went on to make clear that CERCLA was 
intended to extend discovery periods due to the inherent uncertainties 
in determining the subsurface movement of contamination: “The 
effect of [section 9658] is to ensure that if a state statute of limitations 
provides a commencement date for claims . . . resulting from release 
of contaminants that is earlier than the commencement date defined in 
section 9658, then plaintiffs benefit from the more generous 
commencement date.”46 
 
42 311 F.3d 1139, 1146 (9th Cir. 2002). 
43 Id. at 1147 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). 
44 Id. at 1148. As the Ninth Circuit also explained, section 9658 preempts less generous 
state standards regardless of whether the state case alleges a CERCLA cause of action: 
“[D]efendants contend that the federal standard of discovery of claims does not apply to 
plaintiffs’ state court claims because plaintiffs, as individuals, have not alleged an 
underlying CERCLA claim. We disagree. Section 9658 applies to actions that assert state 
law claims without an accompanying CERCLA claim.” Id. at 1148–49. 
45 Id. See also Lessord v. Gen. Elec. Co., 258 F.Supp.2d 209, 2189 (“[T]he mere fact 
that plaintiffs might have known that there was some contamination of their property does 
not mean that they could or should have sued everyone who might be liable. . . . Plaintiffs 
in toxic tort cases . . . should not be encouraged to take a shotgun approach . . . .”) 
(emphasis in original). 
46 Id. at 1146. See also Angeles Chem. Co. v. Spencer & Jones, 44 Cal. App. 4th 112, 
113 (1996) (“The principal question on this appeal is whether the ‘discovery rule’ 
mandated by CERCLA preempts California’s 10-year limitations period, where the claims 
are based on a latent construction defect that results in the toxic contamination of the 
plaintiff’s property. We conclude that it does.”); Bibeau v. Pac. Nw. Research Found., Inc. 
188 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Under this rule [§ 9658], the statute only begins to  
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In Lessord v. General Electric Co.,47 contamination on plaintiffs’ 
property emanated from either a 3M site or a GE site.48 In ruling on a 
summary judgment motion based on the statute of limitations, the 
court noted that the statute commences only after discovering both the 
injury and the cause.49 Even though “plaintiffs concede[d] that they 
were aware at some point prior to 1999 of the presence of some 
minimum levels of contaminants in the stream,” and the plaintiffs’ 
action was not filed until 2001, the court concluded that it did not 
support “a finding that, as a matter of law, the limitations period 
began to run when plaintiffs first became aware of such low levels of 
contaminants.”50 A September 1999 letter reporting high levels of 
contaminants also did not trigger the statute of limitations because the 
letter “did not identify any suspected source of the contamination.”51 
Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs were long aware that there was 
some sort of contamination on their property, they still needed some 
evidentiary basis for asserting liability before they sued 
[defendants]. In fact, had plaintiffs commenced this action in 1996   
. . . defendants very likely would have moved to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim.52 
In some respects, tort remedies in environmental cases have 
provided more flexibility for fashioning practical relief than public 
law remedies. Public law remedies are often all-or-nothing 
 
run once a plaintiff has knowledge of the ‘critical facts’ of his injury, which are ‘that he 
has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury.’”) (citations omitted); Fisher v. Ceiba 
Specialty Chems. Corp. 2007 WL 2995525, at 15 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 11, 2007) 
(commencement period under section 9658 “begin[s] running not when the harmful action 
occurred . . . but rather when plaintiffs knew or reasonably should have known that 
[defendant’s] actions had damaged their property.”). 
47 258 F.Supp. 2d 209 (W.D.N.Y. 2002). 
48 Id. at 210–11. 
49 Id. at 215. 
50 Id. at 216, n.7. 
51 Id. at 217. The court stated: 
It must also be remembered that the GE Site is not the only source of chemical 
contamination in the area, and that there are various contaminants at issue here. As 
stated, the mere fact that plaintiffs might have known that there was some 
contamination of their property does not mean that they could or should have sued 
everyone who might be liable. At this point, it is not even clear that the TCEs 
indicated on the map originated at the GE Site, so it cannot be said as a matter of 
law that plaintiffs’ alleged receipt of this map triggered the limitations period for 
their claims against GE and [the subsequent site owner]. 
Id. at 218 (emphasis in original). 
52 Id. at 219. 
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propositions, where an agency action is either enjoined or not. Tort 
remedies provide greater opportunities for creative voluntary 
solutions between parties (who are not bound by the procedural 
obligations of federal agencies). And, of course, courts have great 
discretion to fashion equitable remedies in tort cases involving 
environmental issues—particularly in nuisance cases. 
II 
JURISPRUDENCE ON STANDING IN CITIZEN SUITS TO ENFORCE 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS 
In contrast to the solicitous approach courts have taken to 
preserving causes of action for environmental damage to private 
property, courts have been reluctant to broadly grant citizen access to 
courts to enforce public rights. 
The current Supreme Court’s hostility toward private enforcement 
of public laws is most dramatically evident in the Court’s opinion in 
Lujan v. National Wildlife Foundation.53 In Lujan, the Court began 
reversing several decades of standing jurisprudence by distinguishing 
its opinion in United States v. Students Challenging United States 
Regulatory Procedures (SCRAP).54 The SCRAP opinion upheld a 
lower court’s refusal to dismiss, on standing grounds, a challenge by 
law students to railroad rate increases that allegedly discriminated 
against recycled material.55 
The plaintiff in Lujan challenged the Secretary of the Interior’s 
“land withdrawal review program,” under which the Secretary was 
permitting land previously withdrawn from development activities, 
such as mining and timber cutting, to become eligible for such 
activities.56 Despite the fact that the plaintiff in Lujan was a national 
environmental organization whose members were more obviously 
affected by such a program than the law students had been by the rate 
making challenged in SCRAP, the Lujan majority found that the 
plaintiff had failed to establish standing.57 The Court distinguished 
SCRAP on the basis that SCRAP involved a motion to dismiss under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), where the allegations of the 
 
53 See 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
54 See 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
55 See id. 
56 Lujan, 497 U.S. at 875–78. 
57 Id. at 889. 
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complaint were to be taken as true, whereas Lujan involved a motion 
for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, 
where the plaintiff was obligated to present evidence to support 
challenged facts.58 The Court then found that the affidavits presented 
by the plaintiff to meet its evidentiary obligations were not 
sufficiently specific about the harm suffered by the plaintiff to satisfy 
standing requirements.59 
Since Lujan, courts have applied increased scrutiny to plaintiff 
claims of harm sufficient to support standing and have viewed 
declarations explaining harm with increased skepticism. In Summers 
v. Earth Island Institute,60 environmental groups represented by 
University of Oregon School of Law and JELL alumnus Matt Kenna 
sued the U.S. Forest Service, challenging regulations that exempted 
small timber salvage projects of 250 acres or less from the notice, 
comment, and appeals process required under the Forest Service 
Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act.61 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that although plaintiffs 
had initially submitted a declaration establishing harm from a 
particular timber sale, a settlement with respect to that sale had 
eliminated standing.62 Justice Scalia went on to hold that a subsequent 
declaration failed to identify a specific area that was both threatened 
by the regulations and used by the declarant, and plaintiffs therefore 
failed to establish standing.63 For Justice Scalia, it did not matter that 
the challenged regulation denied a procedural right embedded in the 
underlying legislation (the right to comment on Forest Service 
proposals that impacted the environment).64 To Justice Scalia and the 
majority, “a procedural right in vacuo” is not enough to provide 
standing.65 It was irrelevant that Congress created the procedural right 
because Congress cannot by statute remove the injury in fact 
requirement of constitutional standing.66 
 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 899. 
60 See 555 U.S. 488 (2009). 
61 Id. at 490. 
62 See id. at 497. 
63 Id. at 495–97. 
64 Id. at 496. 
65 Id. at 496. 
66 Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. at 496. 
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As with Lujan, this opinion championed form over substance and 
barred the courthouse door to a citizen group seeking to hold the 
executive branch accountable for noncompliance with a law adopted 
by the legislative branch. 
The dissent, consisting of Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and 
Ginsburg, noted that the plaintiff organizations had thousands of 
members around the country, and the likelihood was high that the 
Forest Service’s self-granted exemption from environmental 
procedures for thousands of timber sales would have an impact on the 
organizations’ members.67 As Justice Breyer noted: “To know, 
virtually for certain, that snow will fall in New England this winter is 
not to know the name of each particular town where it is bound to 
arrive. The law of standing does not require the latter kind of 
specificity. How could it?”68 Justice Breyer may have intended this 
question to be sincere, but the answer is clear—it can be required 
when five Justices on the Supreme Court demand it. 
III 
CHALLENGES TO PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL AS AN ADDITIONAL 
RESTRICTION ON ACCESS TO COURTS 
Citizen suits to enforce environmental laws and tort cases on behalf 
of public entities to recover for environmental damages do share a 
common phenomenon: attempts by defense counsel to make 
plaintiffs’ counsel, rather than the substance of the case, a primary 
issue. Defendants in public interest environmental law cases, 
including many cases handled by the environmental clinic at the 
University of Oregon School of Law, often challenge the right of 
attorneys representing environmental groups to bring public law 
actions.69 
In Orange County Water District v. Arnold Engineering Co.,70 the 
defendants attempted to disqualify my law firm from bringing a 
public nuisance action on behalf of our public entity client, OCWD, 
 
67 Id. at 502–03. 
68 Id. at 508. 
69 See Robert R. Kuehn, Lessons From Forty Years Of Interference In Law School 
Clinics, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 59 (2011). See also Robert R. Kuehn, Undermining 
Justice: The Legal Profession’s Role In Restricting Access To Legal Representation, 2006 
UTAH L. REV. 1039 (2006). 
70 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 328 (2011). 
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on a contingency basis. The defense argued that such cases were so 
similar to criminal prosecutions that they could only be pursued by 
neutral in-house attorneys with no financial interest in the outcome of 
the case. 
In seeking disqualification, the defendants relied on People ex rel. 
Clancy v. Superior Court of Riverside County71 and County of Santa 
Clara v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County72 for the proposition 
that public entities cannot retain contingency counsel to represent 
them in public nuisance actions. Clancy and Santa Clara involved 
public nuisance claims filed in the name of the people pursuant to 
California Code of Civil Procedure section 731. In both cases, the 
only remedy sought was abatement of the nuisance. 
To rebut these charges and distinguish Clancy, OCWD pointed out 
that although its case involved a nuisance claim, the case was being 
prosecuted on behalf of OCWD, not “the people.” Contingency 
counsel had a client and was answerable to that client. Therefore, the 
case did not involve the risk of private counsel with public 
enforcement discretion and a financial incentive to prosecute that so 
concerned the Clancy court. 
In Santa Clara, the court emphasized, “we specifically observed in 
Clancy that the government was not precluded from engaging private 
counsel on a contingent-fee basis in an ordinary civil case.”73 The 
Santa Clara court also found that the analysis in Clancy had been 
“unnecessarily broad and failed to take into account the wide 
spectrum of cases that fall within the public-nuisance rubric.”74 
In Priceline.com, Inc. v. City of Anaheim,75 the court rejected an 
argument that a city could not employ outside contingency counsel to 
prosecute tax claims. The court observed: 
[W]e are troubled by the notion that lawyers are more apt to treat 
defendants unfairly if they are paid pursuant to a contingency fee 
agreement, rather than an hourly fee agreement. Clancy identifies 
the contingency fee lawyers’ financial interest in the outcome of a 
 
71 39 Cal. 3d 740 (1985). 
72 235 P.3d 21 (Cal. 2010). 
73 Id. at 54. As the Priceline court noted: “[I]t would appear California governments 
have routinely retained contingency fee counsel for decades, before and after Clancy.” 
Priceline.com, infra, note 75, at 1141. See also In re City of San Diego (9th Cir. 2008) 291 
F. App’x. 798, 799–800 (noting that Clancy does not bar public entities from using 
contingency counsel to pursue nuisance claims for economic damages). 
74 Santa Clara, 50 Cal. 4th at 31–32. 
75 Priceline.com, Inc. v. City of Anaheim, 180 Cal App. 4th, 1130 (2010). 
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case as a factor that may interfere with the duty of neutrality. But it 
is just as easily argued that a contingency fee lawyer is less likely to 
pursue meritless litigation, whereas an hourly fee lawyer may have 
a financial motivation to continue prosecuting litigation discovered 
to lack merit. In short, we question the unstated assumption upon 
which Clancy is based.76 
The Priceline court’s observation regarding the financial interests 
of hourly rate and contingency council is accurate but incomplete. 
Hourly rate defense counsel’s financial motivations are to bill more 
hours. This can lead to a reluctance to settle litigation that should be 
settled, thus harming not only the interests of defense counsel’s 
clients, but also the plaintiff’s interests, as limited dollars go to 
meritless defenses rather than to make whole plaintiffs with legitimate 
claims. Hourly rate counsel may also be willing to prosecute meritless 
claims in order to earn significant fees.77 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
During the twenty-five years that JELL has been publishing, courts 
have been receptive to private remedies for environmental harm to 
private property but hostile to citizen attempts to enforce public rights 
to a clean environment. Although this might be explained by a 
judicial view that enforcement of public rights is the job of the 
executive branch, such a view ignores the resource limitations and 
political susceptibility of the executive branch. If environmental 
legislation is to accomplish its intended purpose, courts must be at 
least as solicitous of citizen enforcement efforts as they have been of 
the rights of private parties to recover for environmental damage to 
property interests. Courts should also discourage efforts to make 
opposing counsel, rather than substantive claims, the focus of 
litigation in the environmental arena. 
 
76 Id. at 1148–49. 
77 See Seltzer v. Morton, 154 P. 3d 561 (Mont. 2007) (holding that a large law firm 
engaged in legal thuggery in attempting to get art authenticator to retract opinion). 
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